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We’re not just making history
WE’RE LEARNING FROM IT
2
The Story Line
A S Sh ttl E t hi l  What happened?
 Safety Message?
 pace u e x rave cu ar 
Mobility Unit (pressure garment and 
life-support backpack) was destroyed 
i fl h fi d i f ti l t t  Did we learn from 
our mistakes?
Leveraging earned
n a as  re ur ng a unc ona  es  
in the Johnson Space Center's crew 
systems laboratory. A technician 
standing next to the suit received    
knowledge
     
second-degree burns over his upper 
body during the accident. 
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Excerpt From The Accident 
Investigation Report 
R l t i d egu a or vapor ze  
in less than 1 
second
 O2 availability 
allowed for metal to 
burn
 O2 depress less 
than 2 seconds
 Softgoods burned  
until extinguished -
~1-2 minutes
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Suffered severe 
injuries - hospitalized
Improper reaction –
could have resulted 
in injury or death
Proper reaction –
individuals exited the 
room to safety
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A technician was standing between the suit and test stand
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~2 million dollars worth of damage
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SEMU 3002 /PLSS 1002
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Rear View of SOP/PLSS Regulators
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Not Much Left!
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Probable Causes
 The fire originated in an aluminum 
bodied regulator and valve 
assembly when 6000 psi oxygen As a result of the post fire   -    
was released through the valve 
into the regulator. It was 
postulated that the fire was 
investigation, the regulator 
and valve assembly was 
redesigned, and the aluminum 
in this assembly was replacedprobably caused by one or 
combination of the following:
 the rupture of a thin, internal 
     
with Monel®
This change and several 
section of the aluminum body 
 the ignition of a silicone O-ring 
by compression heating of the 
others were implemented in 
the version of the EMU suit 
that is in use today 
oxygen, or 
 particle impact
12
Secondary Regulator
Scenario 1:
Pl d flanne  ow 
and drill 
configurationScenario 2:
Accident Investigation Report 
Recommendations
1. Nylon smocks tend to melt into the skin with a fire. An alternate 
material should be worn (Durret/ Chemstat)      
2. All test personnel were wearing safety glasses, a requirement when 
operating a high pressure O2 system. This requirement protected 
the injured technician from serious eye damage This regulation      .    
should be rigorously followed during testing
3. This accident highlights the necessity of proper procedures while 
ki ith i t f thi t S ifi ll f t lwor ng w  equ pmen  o  s ype.  pec ca y, sa e y g asses 
and the proper type of protective clothing should be worn. (PPE)  
Cleanliness rules should be followed and technicians should be 
familiar with all corrective measures indicated in case of a system 
failure
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Lessons Learned That Changed The Way 
We Do Business  
 Documentation
 Procedures
 Proper PPE enforced, management held responsible to make 
sure it is available to everyone (VPP program)
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Lessons Learned That Changed The Way 
We Do Business: Documentation & 
Reviews
 TPS System was put into use, stopped working from service 
i t tins ruc ons
 Warnings and Safety notes are on the TPS and a procedures
Hazard Analysis is required
 Perform a TRR as required
 Hardware should be designed with safety in mind. Follow the 
design requirements and get the right people involved during 
PDR, CDR
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Lessons Learned That Changed The Way 
We Do Business: Procedures   
 Procedures were written and a signature list developed  
 We now have a S.P. which includes a checklist review of all 
procedures
R t i t th b f l i th t t t es r c  e num er o  peop e n e area, se  up a es  area 
and only allow the test team members access
 Perform a safety briefing and all members should know how to 
d t th d t t t h th t f dsecure an  evacua e e area an  se  up es  suc  a  sa e an  
rapid evacuation is possible
 Stress Safety, the person who will use the hardware; your friend or 
a co-worker’s LIFE may depend on it
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Lessons Learned That Changed The Way 
We Do Business: PPE   
 PPE provided at entry of lab
 No one is allowed to enter 
without wearing the proper    
equipment
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Fire Triangle
• Adiabatic Compression
• Particle Impact
• Oxygen
• Air
• Frictional Heating
FUEL
• System Components
• Non metals
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-
• Metals
What Do We Do About It?
 The Constellation Space Suit will have all 3 hazards present
 Risk mitigation efforts
 When possible lower potential activation energy sources
 When possible pick materials with higher activation energy 
requirements that are not propagation promoters
 Keep the system clean so that you do not get unwanted, “bad” 
materials
 Mandatory training on oxygen system hazards and safety 
measures
 Use a systematic approach to identify and analyze the ignition 
mechanisms resulting in the safest design and operation of the         
system as possible
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Ignition Mechanisms
Particle Impact
 Heat generated when small particles strike a material with 
sufficient velocity to ignite the particle and/or what it hits
 Most common ignition source in metallic systems
Adiabatic 
Compression
 Heat generated when a gas is compressed from a low to a 
high pressure
 Most common when exposed non-metal close to a dead-end
 Most efficient direct igniter of non-metals and contaminants
Flow Friction
 Oxygen leaking across a polymer in such a way that enough 
heat is generated within the polymer to cause ignition
R i hi h d d d t l i
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 equ res a g  pressure rop an  an expose  non-me a  n a 
flow path
Ignition Mechanisms
Galling, Friction, or 
Mechanical Impact
 Heat generated by the rubbing of two or more parts together
C h tt i RV h k l b l i ompressors, c a er ng s, c ec  va ve are y open ng
 Heat from the ignition and combustion of a more flammable 
t i l i iti l fl bl t i lma er a  gn ng a ess amma e ma er a
 Contamination is a very common, unplanned start for this
Promoted Ignition
 Accumulated static charge on a non-conducting surface 
discharging with enough energy to ignite the receiving 
materialStatic Discharge
 Most severe in a dry environment
Resonance
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Electrical Arc
 -
Acoustic source
Conclusion
 All Must be educated on the topic so that:
 Design of systems both flight and ground with ignition mechanism 
mitigation incorporated
 Maintain systems so that contaminants and leaks do not occur        
 Operate systems, both flight (crew training and procedures) and 
ground (tech training and procedures) to minimize risk by 
maintaining cleanliness thus mitigating adiabatic compression     
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RELEASE NO: 80-039 June lO, 1980
ALSO RELEASED AT NASA HEADQUARTERS
INVESTIGATORS FILE REPORT ON CAUSE OF SPACESUIT BACKPACK FIRE
A NASA board investigating the April 18 Flash Fire in a
spacesuit backpack Found where the fire started and recommended
11 mays to improve safety and reliability of Lhe system.
While Lhe exact cause was not found, the Four most probable
causes of igniLion were cited in the board's reporL to Johnson
Space Center Director Christopher C. Kraft, Jr., after Five meeks
of engineering deLective work that included more Lhan 2,000
unsuccessful aLtempts to reproduce the Fire.
The accident destroyed an unoccupied Space Shuttle spacesuit
and life support backpack. A HamilLon S%andard Lechnician,
Robert A. Mayfield, was severely burned but is recovering and has
been released from Lhe hospital.
- more -
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these tests are conducted to assure that such malfuncitons
are discovered prior to flight, since such an accident during a
mission might well cause serious injury or fatality, or require
premature termination of the mission.
The fire apparently started when the technician switched the
secondary oxygen pack to the "spaeewalk" position during a per-
Formance test in a clean room in the Crew Systems Laboratory.
The secondary pack is attached to the bottom of the main backpack
and provides 30 minutes of emergency oxygen For breathing and to
maintain suit pressure i¢ the main oxygen source fails.
Ignition took place in a V-shaped passage which serves to
restrict the flow of oxygen betmeen a shut-off valve and a chamber
in the pack's regulator module, the investigating board determined.
It said the four most probable causes were:
1. Heating by compression or shock of a thin section
of aluminum betmeen the flow restrictor passage and
the adjacent cavity.
2. Heating by compression or shock of contaminants in
the Flow restrictor.
3. Heating of internal surfaces through mechanical
shock of incoming high-pressure oxygen, or heating
of particles.
4. Similar heating of shut-off valve o-rings.
The board found that all procedures followed during the
April 18 test mere proper. The regulator module had 19 cycles
mith high-pressure oxygen prior to the accident.
- more -
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Technicians mere unable to duplicate the Failure in tests at
Johnson's White Sands Test Facility, Las Cruces, New Mexico. Four
regulator modules of the same Factory batch mere cycled 2,228 times.
Post-test disassembly revealed significant contamination mikhin
the modules.
A regulator module is machined From a single block of aluminum
and is Fitted mith valves, a pressure gauge and tmo step-domn regula-
tors that reduce oxygen supply pressure From 6,000 Lo 3.5 pounds
per square inch. The Flom restrietor consists of kmo 1/16-inch
diameter drilled passages that intersect. IL is betmeen the high
pressure inlet and the First stage regulator.
AFter ignition on April 18, the regulator module burned
through and an oxygen-rich jet of Flame burned the lomer torso of
the attached spacesuit.
The board ruled out backpaek and clean room electrical systems
as ignition sources. It said all clean room support Feed lines
mere pure.
The i1 recommendations of the board are:
o Redesign high pressure oxygen valves and regulators so that
debris eannot be trapped and eliminate "stagnation points" mhere
healing by compression and shock can occur.
o Redesign regulator modules Lo lessen chance of internal
contamination, mhile improving manufacturing inspection techniques.
- more -
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o Reviem Lhe design of all Space ShuLtle high pressure valves
and regulaLors For debris Lraps and unproLeeLed o-rings.
o Replace existing silicone o-rings miLh silicone o-rings
having improved ignition resisLanee.
o Machining regulator module body From monel instead of
aluminum mould reduce ignition potential.
o Inspect completed regulator modules miLh X-rays.
o Consider using neutron radiography Lo confirm thaL o-rings
and oLher non-meLallic componenLs miLh significant hydrogen
contenL are properly installed.
o Machine a dummy regulaLor module body from a block of clear
plastic to verify mall thicknesses and oLher passagemay machining
tolerances.
o Consider comparison impact igniLion tesLing of Teflon or
Kel-F backup rings as a means of reducing shock healing of silicone
o-rings.
o Clarify inLernal NASA specificaLions.
o Consider esLablishing a commiLtee consisLing of NASA and
non-NASA personnel Lo collect existing high-pressure oxygen data_
review and clarify existing design standards and requirements,
recommend any necessary supplimenLs to presently available infor-
mation and publish a comprehensive standard for the design and
use of high-pressure oxygen equipment used in Lhe space program.
- more -
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The investigating board mas headed by Chester A. Vaughan,
propulsion engineer. Members were: Noel Willis, Jr., crew
systems engineer; George D. Nelson, astronaut; Joseph Degioanni,
flight surgeon; and James B. Chappee, safely engineer. Andrew J.
Hoffman of Hamilton Standard served as ex-officio member, and R. L.
Johnston, materials engineer, served as advisor.
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